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Executive summary
A decade after the invasion of Iraq, the 10-year-anniversary of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon 
Islands (RAMSI) later this month will mark an equally significant juncture in Australia’s strategic policy.
The new Defence White Paper 2013 declares that the ADF will be structured around just two of its principal 
tasks: preventing attacks on Australia and promoting stability and security in the South Pacific and Timor-Leste.
But fostering South Pacific security is as difficult as it is important, especially in the large, sometimes volatile, 
states of Melanesia. It’s getting harder, too, as regional partners explore fresh ways to meet familiar but 
deepening challenges.
60
2 Securing the South Pacific: making the most of Australia's renewed regional focus
The white paper also flags a return of Australian interest that had waned—partly because Canberra was focused on the 
Middle East and North Asia but also because of difficulties encountered last time it emphasised regional security under 
the 2003–07 ‘more interventionist approach’.
Given how fast major crises can arise, Canberra should continue to enhance the ADF’s capabilities for regional 
intervention. That suggests against cutting the Army’s regular infantry battalions. To help avoid such crises (and to 
prepare the ADF and partner forces for them) we should vigorously pursue the white paper’s focus on deeper regional 
defence relationships. A crucial but as yet unfunded element of that engagement is the Pacific Maritime Security 
Program, which would preserve the ADF’s strategic presence across the region and help partner countries police a 
vast area Australia would otherwise have to patrol itself. Canberra should also renew its investment in Pacific policing 
because of the extent of regional criminal threats and the crucial role of the Australian Federal Police in stabilising crises.
If Australia wants partner countries to go along with its desire to lead, it will need innovative approaches as well as 
improved security tools. New ADF capabilities to project power into the region will give Canberra better options but 
also greater scope for missteps. Australia should use its whole-of-government procedures to explore such matters 
in advance.
Australia’s soft power may prove just as important as its capability clout. Getting that right requires a nuanced 
understanding of individual countries, so the government would benefit from a deeper, more sustained, conversation 
between Pacific and security scholars and officials.
It might also be best to take a soft power approach to evolving Pacific regionalism. Instead of trying to shape Melanesian 
Spearhead Group initiatives in order to preserve Australian security leadership, Canberra may get the best results on 
difficult security issues (such as West Papua) by giving regional leaders as much room and responsibility as possible.
Finally, Canberra should be in no hurry to draw China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into military cooperation in the 
South Pacific—there are better locations elsewhere for that important task.
Indications and drivers of growing interest
The ADF passed a milestone with the end of Operation Anode, the military component of RAMSI, on 1 July 2013. Of its 
other two significant local interventions, Operation Astute in Timor-Leste concluded in March, and Operation Bel Isi in 
Bougainville ended in August 2003.
Canberra might have been expected to draw a line under such long-running commitments. An appetite for risky, costly1, 
new operations is unlikely under deficit budgets when there’s no local crisis brewing.
Yet January’s national security strategy identifies enhanced regional engagement as one of just three main priorities for 
the next five years.2 The region features in Foreign Secretary Varghese’s 6+2+N formulation of Australia’s international 
priorities, in which N is for neighbourhood.3 Investing to shape a favourable strategic environment is a bipartisan 
priority, too.
Although there’s a gap ‘between the strategic theology of the initial chapters of the white paper and the wish list of 
equipment projects further in’4 (and the other two principal tasks of contributing to Indo-Pacific and global security, as 
well as factors such as the US rebalance, are obviously significant too) its regional focus is real. South Pacific countries 
contain fewer than 10 million of the half a billion people between Australia and China, but they sit astride Australia’s near 
lines of communication and it’s considered essential no major military power establish bases in the area. That’s why every 
defence white paper since 1976 has included the South Pacific as a main focus, even at the height of ADF operations and 
major strategic developments elsewhere.
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Canberra’s renewed attention mainly reflects concerns that security in the near neighbourhood could deteriorate quickly 
in the face of persistent development and security challenges, requiring the ADF to conduct stabilisation missions. The 
challenges include fast-growing populations, youth bulges, high unemployment, periodic political instability and poor 
governance. Given this scope for trouble (see box), Australia might need to deploy a brigade-sized force into the near 
region again with little warning.6
The 2013 white paper’s regional focus is also partly cost-driven.7 Put simply, an ADF designed around protecting the 
continent and regional stabilisation operations will be less expensive than a force designed for future high-end war-
fighting in Northeast Asia. The focus on regional security gives the ADF a coherent foundation for force structure planning 
based on ‘credible contingencies’ that are actually likely, and provides opportunities to retain useful and interesting roles 
after Afghanistan.8 
The regional focus reflects slight anxieties about local ripples from China’s rise too.
Key factors complicating the regional security focus
Some of the trends that have sharpened Australian interest in the South Pacific make promoting regional security 
harder. For all its clout, Canberra has never had, nor really sought, tight local control. It aspires to great influence, 
reaching towards a loose dominance, but has only ever fitfully devoted the sort of attention that would give it anything like 
hegemony—loose or tight. The international setting’s now more competitive, and local leaders are ever less receptive to 
perceived pushiness, so it’s uncertain whether Canberra’s renewed inclination to exercise leadership is matched by the 
neighbours’ readiness to offer what Graeme Dobell calls ‘followship’.9
All Australia’s Melanesian, and most Polynesian and Micronesian, partners confront serious, mainly internal, 
security challenges:
•	 Papua New Guinea (PNG) ended its year-long constitutional crisis with the 2012 election but only after 
‘muddling through’ had been stretched to near breaking point. As Australia’s chief diplomat in PNG at the time 
diplomatically put it, ‘for a moment, there appeared to be a real risk that PNG would walk away from its proud 
democratic record.’5
•	 Mining and fishing won’t fully fund Solomon Islands’ budget shortfall, sustain neo-traditional patronage 
networks, soak up labour from the country’s youth bulge, or help balance uneven rural–urban development 
exacerbated by the near exhaustion of unsustainable logging.
•	 There’s potential for renewed tension ahead of Bougainville’s referendum or if the PNG Government refuses to 
ratify a possible vote for full independence (as it could under the 2001 peace agreement).
•	 Indonesian President Yudhoyono now lacks spare political capital to invest in Aceh-type concessions to reduce 
rural Papuans’ growing sense of relative deprivation, and it’s uncertain whether this will be a priority for 
his successor.
•	 In Tonga, as elsewhere, past tensions, such as those behind the 2006 riots in Nuku’alofa and Honiara, could 
reignite with little warning.
•	 As the International Crisis Group recently pointed out, although Timor-Leste (which regards itself mainly as 
an Asian country) is growing strongly, its fragile stability remains vulnerable to convulsions in the patronage 
networks underpinning recent progress.
Some areas serious violence could emerge quickly
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Growing diplomatic attention and economic growth give regional states new models and options. The white paper doesn’t 
assert that Australia must remain the region’s ‘security partner of choice’ as early drafts reportedly did10, but it notes 
that ‘the growing reach and influence of Asian nations opens up a wider range of external players for our neighbours to 
partner with.’
Beijing probably isn’t pursuing a grand design to supersede Australia in the region’s aid, trade and strategies or displace 
the US as the South Pacific’s dominant military power, and there’s little evidence that it’s actively seeking to project 
hard power into the region.11 However, its increasing presence and weight in the neighbourhood complicate Canberra’s 
strategic calculus even when it isn’t trying to. The sale of Chinese patrol boats to Timor-Leste in 2008 for murky but 
apparently mainly commercial reasons is a case in point.12 Signs that PNG considered seeking a large Chinese loan to 
recapitalise their defence force13 (Beijing apparently responded cautiously14) had potential to ruffle feathers, too. And 
regional countries’ indebtedness to Beijing probably doesn’t buy the sort of influence that’s sometimes fretted about but 
may have growing potential to spark acute violence.
Strong economic figures give some countries new confidence to resist traditional donors’ advice. High growth in 
Timor-Leste enabled Dili to refuse to host a regional asylum-seeker processing centre in 2010 and to take an assertive 
stance on disputed maritime boundaries in the Timor Sea.
Development, political and security pressures complicate Canberra’s efforts to lead on regional security. The challenges 
include population pressure, environmental degradation, natural disasters, rapid social change, crime, poverty, 
urbanisation, unemployment, gender inequality and maladministration. Strong growth in some countries is off a low base, 
unevenly spread, and vulnerable to commodity price and investment fluctuations. Even in PNG, where real GDP grew by 
7.7% last year, revenues from liquefied natural gas won’t offset declines in other areas until 2018—raising the spectre of 
unsustainable borrowing.
Although Australia shares fundamental strategic interests with its neighbours, their different histories, circumstances 
and outlooks create divergent security priorities and approaches. For example, although Fiji, Tonga and PNG all 
contribute to international peacekeeping, the ADF’s integration into US alliance commitments elsewhere gives Canberra 
different imperatives from theirs.
Individual leaders’ sectional interests are much closer to the surface in countries with less bureaucratic and more 
personal governance. This produces local scandals and uneven policy decisions and can lead to messages and 
assumptions that seem entirely clear to one defence force being lost on another. Differences in perspectives and priorities 
With the sort of military and economic sanctions required to bring the Fijian regime to its knees seeming 
disproportionate or draconian, Australia’s carrots and sticks have so far bounced off Commodore Bainimarama as 
easily as the phrase ‘creative middle power diplomacy’ rolls off the tongue.15 When Canberra has tried to negotiate 
a compromise, he’s made it clear it would have to capitulate on election timing and modalities to really re-engage.16 
All that Pacific Islands Forum members have been able to do is offer support for a 2014 election under rules that can 
be regarded as ‘democratic’.
The standoff continues to hurt the Forum and Australia’s place in it, since Canberra has to corral members to stay 
resolute. The Fijian regime has turned angrily and noisily to other sources of support. That mainly means Beijing, 
but also involves states such as North Korea and Iran. And although the impacts of Fiji’s estrangement can be 
overstated, Suva has succeeded as a spoiler against some Forum initiatives it’s barred from and has boosted forums 
that exclude external powers.
The Fiji question
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are evident even with our most trusted defence partners, as was shown by Canberra’s caution on Port Moresby’s plans to 
increase the size of, and refocus, the PNG Defence Force (PNGDF).17
Suva’s suspension from the Pacific Islands Forum in 2009 for ditching scheduled elections and for low-end human rights 
abuses leaves a conspicuous hole in a regional organisation built on consensus to provide a unified regional voice, but 
which currently looks a bit ‘like ASEAN without Indonesia or Thailand’ (see box).18
Future directions
How then should Canberra make the most of its renewed focus on South Pacific security?
The 10 policy recommendations here all build on activities partly underway. The first, third and fifth could be applied 
cost-neutrally against forward estimates but would preclude future cost-cutting. The fourth involves a significant future 
cost that’s recognised but not yet budgeted for.19
1. Keep enhancing the ADF’s capabilities to operate in the region
Australia's nearest neighbours are a long way from key ADF and commerical fuel, supply and logistic hubs across a 
region that encompasses a quarter of the world’s ocean. Even a permissive ADF intervention, actively supported by 
neighbours, could soak up a lot of troops and supplies in this environment. 
After more than a decade in the Middle East, the ADF is seasoned by combat and led by junior officers and NCOs with 
operational experience in allied enterprises, but also in stabilisation and nation-building roles close to home—especially 
leading INTERFET from 1999.
With the exception of Bougainville in 1998, ‘the rapid insertion of overwhelming force in a context where the political 
ground had been very carefully prepared’20 helped the ADF talk softly and generally avoid using its big stick. That 
suggests Australia should further enhance the ADF’s ability to deliver a degree of ‘shock and awe’ to sustain local 
overmatch in all likely regional tasks and avoid cutting the Army’s regular infantry battalions—expanded from just six to 
eight in 2006—when the next Treasurer asks Defence to help bring the budget back to surplus.
Given the region’s susceptibility to natural disasters, Canberra should also enhance the ADF’s humanitarian assistance 
capacity. Exercising this capability regularly with neighbouring militaries and agencies helps to provide a rationale for the 
force’s enduring regional presence and boosts its welcome and familiarity.
Some formidable new tools for such operations are in the pipeline. They include the Navy’s two new Canberra class 
amphibious ships, the Army’s Plan Beersheba to create three multi-role combat brigades, the RAAF’s C-27 tactical 
airlifters, and a partly marinised deployable Joint Force Headquarters.
It will take time and effort to build the amphibious capabilities required to evacuate Australians and others during a 
regional crisis, let alone restore stability after a major breakdown of order.21 For now, the ADF is starting by creating an 
Amphibious Ready Element drawn from a single battalion.22
2. Think carefully about how to use those LHDs
While ADF planners are focusing on new capabilities and the region, the political and policy implications of Australia’s 
growing ability to project power need more whole-of-government attention.
For example, Australia might need to rescue citizens from a neighbouring state without active support from that country’s 
authorities and in the face of organised opposition.23 Better tools, such as embarked Tiger helicopters, will give the government 
unprecedented technical ability to deliver force ‘directly against strong opponents in well-defended positions’.24 And Graeme 
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Dobell suggests public satisfaction with recent regional stabilisation operations has quietly transformed impulses implicit in 
Australia’s history, national psyche and instinct for strategic denial, into a de facto regional security guarantee.
The issues could be even thornier if Australian citizens aren’t directly imperilled. Around 200 people died before Australia 
ultimately intervened in the Solomons but, as Timor-Leste showed in 1999, there’s an unquantifiable threshold beyond which 
nearby civilians being massacred with impunity creates a public clamour to ‘do something’ that overtakes ordinary diplomatic 
and cost imperatives.
The future amphibious capability will offer ways to do something about a wider range of ills, but acting on this may not always 
be such a good idea.  In the Middle East, Canberra’s re-learning that it’s easy to get into overseas adventures but harder to get 
out25, and that the tools to win every encounter don’t guarantee strategic success. It could then be useful for ministers and 
department heads to consider what extra reach the new capabilities will and won’t deliver, and the broader consequences of 
this, well before quick decisions need to be made.
3. Tighten the ADF’s day-to-day enmeshment with regional forces
The Defence White Paper 2013 commits the ADF to greater regional engagement to prepare it for potential evacuation and 
stabilisation operations, ensure that it can cooperate well with partners, and reduce the likelihood that such operations 
will be required. The government has increased military cooperation with the South Pacific and PNG by 14% in the very 
tight 2012–13 Defence budget and by nearly 30% in the 2013–14 budget.
HMAS Tobruk at anchor near Vanimo in Papua New Guinea whilst deployed on Pacific Partnership 2013, an annual humanitarian aid mission. Image courtesy Defence Department
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Defence Minister Smith’s trip to Tonga for the first South Pacific Defence Ministers Meeting (SPDMM) on the eve of 
delivering his white paper resulted in a joint communique committing to stronger interoperability, information sharing, 
disaster relief, maritime security and joint exercises.26
The signing of the Australia–PNG Defence Cooperation Arrangement a week later also emphasised regional security 
cooperation.27 A new regional exercise framework28 provides scope to develop interoperability, regional capabilities, and 
(subject to regional agreement) opportunities for regular rotations of US Marines to train and exercise with local partners 
in Darwin or overseas. It should also help keep potentially idle hands busy following the end of RAMSI’s military mission.
ASPI is about to offer recommendations for updating defence engagement in the South Pacific and further afield. As that 
report will show, it’s better to shape a positive setting and prevent threats emerging than to respond once problems are 
gaining momentum.
4. Renew support for regional maritime security coordination
Given the importance of fishing to local economies and the region’s small populations and vast exclusive economic zones, 
the SPDMM also focused on how to modernise cooperative efforts to protect marine resources, enforce sovereignty and 
counter transnational crime.
The Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) estimates that illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing plunders a billion dollars 
from the South Pacific every year.29 This is mainly due to misreporting and transhipment, which is exacerbated by weak 
physical surveillance capacity and limited policing and patrolling. Some fishing vessels allegedly also traffic in humans 
and smuggle weapons, narcotics and other contraband.
Australia’s renewed regional security focus should encourage Navy to increase its commitment to the Pacific Maritime 
Security Program (PMSP) as an unexciting but valuable asset rather than an orphan program. Although every agency 
regards the PMSP as a useful successor to the Pacific Patrol Boat program for promoting Australian national and 
regional interests, none has particularly wanted to pay for it, and it’s been passed back and forth between Defence and 
Customs since 2009. The PMSP could build on institutions such as the FFA’s Regional Fisheries Surveillance Centre 
in Honiara and Niue Treaty subsidiary arrangements for tracking and hot pursuit of suspect vessels across maritime 
jurisdictions, as well as mechanisms for coordinating aerial maritime surveillance. It also offers a way to more deeply 
engage military assistance from the US and France, probably Japan30, and possibly Indonesia.
Modern best-practice military options for the PMSP may challenge some partners. Leasing platforms, pooling regionally 
owned capabilities, and sharing responsibilities and information could all be sensitive for recently decolonised countries. 
Some face inter- and intra-governmental rivalries and capacity constraints that would make intricate multiagency tasks 
or information sharing costly and tricky. Maintaining autonomy from the Anzac ‘big brothers’ could also be a higher 
priority than efficiency and effectiveness, despite the revenue lost to weak maritime capacity. And some regional leaders 
benefit personally from that weakness.
Such issues should be manageable, but as the PMSP sponsor Canberra will need an uncommonly deft touch. For 
example, it may need to bite its tongue about any equipment that regional countries manage to acquire independently of 
the program. PMSP won’t be cheap (requiring up to a billion dollars new investment beyond current forward estimates 
but starting before 2019) but being as flexible as possible about integrating regional preferences would help to build 
neighbours' capabilities to police an immense area Australia would otherwise have to monitor, while promoting the 
continuing acceptance of the ADF’s permanent strategic presence across the region.
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5. Renew Australia’s commitment to Pacific policing
While the ADF’s regional footprint is expanding, the presence of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) is shrinking in 
some areas.
Law enforcement emerged as an increasingly important ingredient in Australia’s national security mix after 9/11 and the 
2002 Bali bombings. The ‘policing the neighbourhood’ approach found form in RAMSI in mid-2003 and the establishment 
of AFP’s International Deployment Group (IDG) in early 2004 to provide for police deployments to stability, security and 
peacekeeping operations. It received a half billion dollar boost in August 2006 to move towards 1,200 staff, including the 
rapidly deployable 150-member Operational Response Group, following urban rioting in the Solomons and Timor. Other 
elements of the ‘new interventionism’ included the attempt to put 210 Australian police on the beat alongside PNG police 
(and embed 65 senior officials in other agencies) under the $800 million Enhanced Cooperation Program. There were 
also efforts to strengthen the Pacific Islands Forum, second AFP officers to head several Pacific police forces, expand the 
AFP’s Law Enforcement Cooperation Program, and provide financial and technical help for struggling Nauru.31 Australia’s 
decision in 2005 to double and better target its aid, after this had fallen to a 30-year low, was also shaped by concerns 
about fragile states on its periphery.32
While the IDG still uses 20% of AFP resources, its prominence waned as the national security decade wound down.33 
By April 2012, it was down to 315 staff deployed overseas plus 40 staff in Australia’s external territories.34 Recently 
announced initiatives, such as the rollout of the third phase of the 23-person Australia–PNG Police Partnership, are 
increasingly sophisticated and won’t be cheap, but include almost no increased resources. Elsewhere, there have been 
cuts to the AFP network after difficulties gaining the robust legal immunities the AFP demands before conducting 
community policing overseas, and due to frustration at apparent political interference when regional police services that 
it’s partnering are closing in on well-connected leaders suspected of corruption.
There are two key reasons to expand rather than reduce the AFP’s regional policing capability—both the IDG and the law 
enforcement network serving alongside regional police every day in line, advisory and liaison positions. First, it brings 
skills quite different from the ADF’s to the crisis and post-conflict phases of stabilisation missions. That’s why the AFP 
will continue to contribute to RAMSI now that the military mission is over. Second, complex domestic and transnational 
law and order challenges are generally of greater interest to regional governments and people than external aggression. 
They can contribute to the sort of insecurity that might need a stabilisation mission if left unchecked.
6. Keep refining mechanisms to harness all of Australia’s national levers
The 2013 white paper recognises that ‘security and development are two sides of the same coin—both are necessary for 
lasting stability and prosperity’, and that agencies other than the ADF and AFP have roles to play in regional security.
Australia’s crisis policymaking apparatus worked quite well in 199935, and since then Canberra has built on lessons 
learned about coordinating agencies. The establishment of the National Security Division in the Prime Minister’s 
Department in 2003, expanded to a group headed by a National Security Adviser from 2008, also created a mechanism to 
elevate DFAT-led country strategies for consideration by the National Security Committee of Cabinet.
Still, other departments don’t always share Defence’s priorities or assumptions. Interdepartmental committees 
assembled to manage practical, cross-jurisdictional issues below crisis level, and guided by fairly broad government 
direction and their members’ organisational aims, don’t always work either.36 Heads of mission coordinate security 
initiatives with other activities at overseas posts, especially during crises, but home agencies shape most big overseas 
spending programs with their ministers. And agencies’ shares of each Budget reflect complex historical patterns, 
interests, debates and the different costs of doing business in particular fields that normally shift fairly slowly.
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Continuing efforts in and outside Canberra to improve priority-setting and resource allocation, and foster a cohesive 
national security community culture able to go ‘beyond coordination and committees’37, will all help.
7. Develop trade and other tools to maximise Australia’s soft power
Influence derived from business, public, personal and historical links is harder to steer than deliberate public relations 
tools, but at least as relevant. Australia needs to emphasise the breadth, depth and special history of its regional 
engagement in what’s now a more competitive setting.
Canberra’s position as regional superpower, indispensable donor and a former colonial power inevitably stokes ‘perennial 
Pacific irritation’.38 Power asymmetries—Australia’s economy is 100 times the size of even PNG’s—and different historical 
experiences and cultural expectations mean misunderstandings arise quite often. The slight compromise of sovereignty 
inherent in accepting any aid means that an insensitive act, such as subjecting a leader to a security check, can be 
escalated into a diplomatic spat and allegations that Australia’s aid is paternalistic and self-serving.
Various bureaucratic levers are available to try to counter negative perceptions, demonstrate leadership credentials, 
set norms and present a coherent Australian narrative to the region.39 They include alumni associations, arts outreach, 
sporting initiatives and public broadcasting.40 DFAT also runs targeted engagement campaigns to cultivate positive 
attitudes towards Australia among emerging opinion-makers. All such public diplomacy tools need to be continually 
fine-tuned to stay effective.
A focus on promoting economic growth also plays well. Moving from the duty- and quota-free access to Anzac 
markets allowed since 1981 towards the single regional market under negotiation as the Pacific Agreement on Closer 
Economic Relations (PACER+) entails a painful transition away from tariff-based revenue.41 Yet initiatives to boost 
regional advantages in natural resources, tourism and remittances (such as the Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme, 
Mining-for-Development initiative, and Pacific Horticultural and Agricultural Market Access program), and efforts to 
strengthen links between business councils, major companies, professional associations, and financial institutions and 
their regional branches, have shown some promise.
The tone and style of public discourse affect Canberra’s influence, especially during ADF/AFP stabilisation missions. 
Whether such operations are requested (Timor-Leste and the Solomons) or only grudgingly allowed (the Enhanced 
Cooperation Program in PNG), inevitable strains are compounded by any conditionality-focused ‘tough love’ language, 
which regional leaders find patronising and demeaning.42 Dangerous crises were stabilised and valuable regional reforms 
begun last time Australia focused on regional security, but relationships had become so strained that partners were 
hardly talking to one another and essential further cooperation stalled by the end of the 2003–07 ‘more interventionist 
approach’.43 Differences that might otherwise have been worked through spurred mutual frustration and claims that 
Australia was playing ‘deputy sheriff’.44
The subsequent ‘partnerships for development’ approach, which stresses shared interests and responsibilities, mutual 
respect and modernised cooperation45, allows Canberra to mostly provide what aid it thinks its neighbours need while 
ceding sufficient priority-setting to make it valued by recipients.
8. Deepen the conversation between Pacific scholars and security planners
The effective use of soft power depends on a nuanced understanding of politics, economics, society and culture in the 
countries Canberra wants to influence.
The complex interplay of micro-level cultural factors with national and global dynamics means Canberra must bring deep 
expertise to bear to address practical problems. For example, some suggest that Australia’s simplistic understanding of 
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local cultural subtleties led to Canberra being caught off guard by, and possibly helping trigger, renewed violence in the 
Solomons and Timor in 2006.46
An important conference at the Australian National University in February aimed to spark a dialogue between Pacific 
scholars, strategists and defence planners to help bridge the gap between policy and research.47 If that dialogue could be 
sustained and widened to take in policymakers and officials, those deeper perspectives might have real impact informing 
Australian strategy (and offer the experts direct policy-relevance and exchange with well-informed practitioners 
in return).
AusAID’s recent decision to boost funding for the university’s State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Program makes 
it more likely that such a dialogue will develop. Even if that doesn’t happen, the program could help policymakers draw on 
fine-grained research.
9. Don’t rush to refocus Australia’s commitment to Pacific regionalism
Suva’s suspension from the Pacific Islands Forum accelerated a partial fracturing of South Pacific regionalism. The 
‘Pacific Way’ consensus first articulated by Fiji’s founding prime minister owed more to a hierarchical, elite-driven 
and conservative perspective of traditional Polynesian leadership48 than to the highly competitive, personally focused, 
fragmentary and rough-and-tumble style of politics in Melanesian societies.49
As economic, political and numerical weight in the Forum drifted towards Melanesia, Canberra hoped the 2005 Pacific 
Plan would focus the forum away from perceived grandstanding towards regional integration and more coherent, efficient 
and effective functional agencies.50 Yet the plan highlighted the Forum’s inconsistencies and created ‘more cracks to 
paper over’.51 In the middle of the last decade, Australia–Solomons tensions over the direction of RAMSI, continuing 
fallout with PNG over the Moti affair and the Enhanced Cooperation Program, and the frosty response to Fiji’s 2006 coup 
added more friction.
Sitting at the crossroads of Polynesia and Melanesia, Fiji didn’t join the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) until 1996, 
a decade after its first coup. The MSG adopted a constitution in 2007 and established a secretariat in 2008.52 Richard 
Herr suggests that Australia should adopt a ‘two regions approach’ to the Pacific islands in case the MSG ‘develops its 
institutional capacity in the way its members now clearly intend’ as the ‘principal regional organ for the vast majority of 
Pacific Islanders and portal of choice for the new, mainly Asian, interests in the Pacific Islands’.53
However, Australia needn’t abandon faith in region-wide regionalism just yet. The Forum’s practical programs and 
partners improve health, education and economic outcomes, reduce poverty and raise living standards. While its political 
voice is a bit quieter, its region-wide perspective remains useful.
It’s also uncertain whether the MSG has as much potential as hoped. The agencies that would form its disaster response 
force probably lack the funding, expertise, personnel and tools to create a viable unit, for example.54 Although MSG 
countries are strengthening preferential trading arrangements, the modest commerce between them (only $23 million a 
year between even Fiji and PNG) remains subject to a tariff list, and includes cross-investment in creaky national telcos 
and more diplomatically than commercially driven acquisitions.
There may also be a limit to how far the MSG, as an overtly anticolonial organisation, will welcome Australia’s 
engagement. The differences in Australian and MSG approaches to West Papua illustrate this tension. Whereas the 
MSG is considering West Papuan membership, a condolence message for a West Papuan activist was voted down in the 
Australian Senate late last year, and Australia’s ambassador in Jakarta offered commiserations for Indonesian soldiers 
killed by guerrillas early this year. If Australia did gain observer membership, it would be resented for having to moderate 
adventurous MSG positions.
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Canberra’s best hope for a productive relationship with the MSG may lie in not seeking formal ties but offering low-key 
support. If Canberra can bring itself to genuinely welcome Melanesian countries’ desire to lead, give them as much space 
as possible, and make it clear it intends to hold them to a high standard, it might avoid provoking resistance and even 
forge a constructive partnership. For example, it’s hard to imagine Australia could have expected a better outcome than 
the MSG Leader’s Summit delaying a vote on West Papuan Membership and opting instead for renewed dialogue with 
Jakarta55 if Canberra had been pressing hard for its own solution and getting in the way of Melanesian compromise.
On the Fiji question, Richard Herr worries that Canberra has painted itself into a corner against a military likely to 
remain a feature of politics, and that onerous conditions for lifting sanctions56 will prolong the impasse. Where, he asks, 
will Canberra go when elections are held ‘under a constitution it regards as flawed by a process it deems biased?’57 
Well, Australia’s strong support for PNG’s election suggests it could accommodate some pretty wild procedural 
irregularities58, as long as ballots aren’t systematically rigged to deliver a particular result. Bainimarama’s lack of a 
natural constituency beyond the military means he mightn’t prevail even if he goes to the polls on a fairly uneven playing 
field. If he does win an unfair election, Australia will have to decide whether to treat a ‘New Order’ Fiji as it did Suharto’s 
New Order Indonesia. Graeme Dobell suggests Canberra would probably grit its teeth and get on with it.59 But that bridge 
can be crossed if we come to it. In the meantime, Canberra should make clear that it’s prepared to provide any reasonable 
assistance to ensure the regime doesn’t feel it needs to cling to power at all costs, since it’s hard to see how Australia 
could avoid imposing harsh sanctions if the regime walks away from elections entirely.
Prime Minister Bainimarama of the Republic of the Fiji Islands, addresses the general debate of the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly, 26 September 2009. UN Photo/Devra Berkowitz
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10. Don’t hurry to welcome the PLA
Finally, what should we make of suggestions that aid projects and military exercises with South Pacific countries offer a 
relatively low-risk opportunity to encourage cooperation with China?60
Beijing’s diplomatic efforts in the South Pacific over the past 30 years, mainly to block Taiwan, haven’t always been 
helpful, and Australian and local officials are likely to be fairly cautious. There are few signs that Beijing wants to use 
its growing influence to carve out a strategic presence so far from its shores and close to Australia’s, but the risks for 
Canberra won’t be low if one day it does.
Although  the SPDMM envisages inviting ‘new partners’ to observe regional military exercises, Jenny Hayward-Jones 
seems close to the mark recommending that future collaboration with China occur in areas that support Pacific island 
economic development priorities and avoid focusing too much on security.
Australia can’t prevent China playing important roles in the South Pacific, and shouldn’t try to. Globally, it’s essential that 
China not be excluded from normal and normalising military engagement in every theatre. But encouraging a PLA that 
doesn’t seem in a rush to operate in Australia’s immediate approaches to do so would be something else altogether. China 
is too much stronger than other countries in this region, and the region’s too vital to Australian interests, for that. Instead, 
Canberra should use its evolving strategic partnership with Beijing to try to help integrate PLA military engagement into 
structures and activities where other participants have sufficient weight to accommodate it. And even in that, Australia’s 
guiding principle should be ‘first do no harm’.
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Acronyms and abbreviations
ADF  Australian Defence Force
AFP  Australian Federal Police
DFAT  Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
FFA  Forum Fisheries Agency
IDG  International Deployment Group (AFP)
MSG  Melanesian Spearhead Group
PLA  People’s Liberation Army
PMSP  Pacific Maritime Security Program
PNG  Papua New Guinea
PNGDF  PNG Defence Force
RAMSI  Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
SPDMM  South Pacific Defence Ministers Meeting
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